US foreign investments are back—so is this the moment Washington finally starts out-building Beijing in the places that matter most?
In early January 2026, the investment headlines stopped sounding abstract and started sounding like ports, rail lines, and hard cash. Moreover, the Trump administration’s early pattern looks less like a slogan and more like a financing doctrine: squeeze risk, pull allies close, and put US-backed capital where China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) once found open doors.
Notably, Panama has become the clearest case study. The country sits on the world’s most strategic shortcut, and it now shows signs of a deliberate rebalancing away from Beijing and towards North American and allied capital. Meanwhile, similar signals show up in Africa’s critical-mineral logistics and in the Western Hemisphere’s sudden “China risk” repricing after Venezuela’s turmoil.
For Canada, this shift is not a spectator sport. Additionally, when the United States (US) reasserts influence through infrastructure and investment, Canadian supply chains feel it—especially in aerospace, defence, and advanced manufacturing.
US foreign investments: the Panama pivot
American overseas investment meets the canal’s strategic physics
Panama rarely needs help finding attention. However, it does need help finding the right money, on the right terms, for projects that cannot fail.
In February 2025, Panama said it would let its involvement in China’s Belt and Road Initiative expire after pressure from Washington and a high-profile visit by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (Reuters, February 3, 2025). Consequently, that decision became the first big visible signal that Panama intended to rebalance its external financing options.
Even so, the bigger story is not a memorandum. Instead, it is the asset map: ports at both ends of the canal, fuel and water projects in the canal zone, and a proposed Panamá–David–Frontera rail spine running west from the Panama City area to David and Paso Canoas on the Costa Rican border (Presidencia de la República de Panamá, December 26, 2024).
Notably, that east–west national project is distinct from the existing (north-south) Panama Canal Railway line, which already carries freight and passengers between Balboa (near Panama City) and Colón along the canal.
At first glance, it reads like an infrastructure investor’s due‑diligence list. However, each line item sets standards, operators, and financing terms that can last decades. Consequently, the global contest keeps returning to Panama because few places concentrate that much leverage.
If geopolitics had a customer-support hotline, it would probably route every call to Panama City.
Washington-backed financing and the port chessboard
Ports are not glamorous. However, they are the quiet machinery of air cargo, maritime logistics, and aerospace supply chains.
Canal-zone port tenders and concession design
In August 2025, Reuters reported that the Panama Canal planned a competitive tender for two new ports in the canal zone, as part of a broader infrastructure and services expansion (Reuters, August 14, 2025). Notably, the canal’s leadership said it expected to invest about US$8.5 billion over five years to update and expand infrastructure. Additionally, executives aimed to meet shipping companies in December 2025 and complete prequalification in early 2026.
That is not “aid.” It is industrial policy via concession design.
Moreover, the port story connects directly to the question of Chinese influence. A Hong Kong-based firm, CK Hutchison, operates two key ports near the canal. In July 2025, Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino said public-private partnerships could take over the ports if courts invalidate the contract. Separately, CK Hutchison said it had invested US$1.7 billion in the Balboa and Cristobal ports, as Panama’s comptroller general audited the concession and Panama’s Supreme Court and attorney general reviewed its renewal (Reuters, April 9, 2025).
Meanwhile, Reuters later described a sweeping US effort to target what Washington sees as China’s grip on global ports. Importantly, the reporting said the White House considered supporting private US or Western firms to buy Chinese stakes in ports, and it explicitly noted Panama as a concern point.
In practical terms, that becomes “replacement capital.” Furthermore, replacement capital rarely looks like a single flag planting. Instead, it looks like bid rules, financing terms, political-risk insurance, and a pile of due diligence.
For aviation readers, ports still matter. Additionally, aerospace depends on predictable logistics for engines, avionics, composites, and time-critical spares. When ports swing between operators, the ripple hits everything from air cargo scheduling to parts inventories at maintenance, repair and overhaul (MRO) hubs.
US development finance and the Panama–David train: replacing the planner, not only the lender
Notably, Panama illustrates a broader pattern: the West competes best when it executes projects cleanly.
In December 2024, Panama’s National Railway Secretariat awarded AECOM USA a US$2.2 million technical advisory contract to update the master plan for the Panamá–David–Frontera rail project, an east–west corridor planned to run from Panama City toward David and the Costa Rican border (Presidencia de la República de Panamá, December 26, 2024).
That contract matters more than its dollar value. Moreover, it signals a structural choice: Panama is leaning toward Western engineering, standards, and procurement logic for the concept phase.
The project’s origin story also underscores why Panama looks like “replacement” territory. In late 2024 reporting, Swissinfo, citing EFE, noted that China had sought the project and that an earlier Chinese estimate in 2019 put the cost above US$4 billion (Swissinfo (EFE), December 27, 2024).
So where does Japan come in?
In August 2025, Panama’s La Estrella de Panamá reported that President Mulino met with executives from Japan’s Mizuho Bank, which expressed interest in financing infrastructure projects, including the Panama–David train (La Estrella de Panamá (EFE), August 11, 2025). Moreover, that same report pointed to Japanese financing already active in Panama’s rail transit ecosystem, including Metro Line 3 loans.
Separately, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) described a major official development assistance (ODA) loan for Panama Metro Line 3, including “high-quality monorail vehicles” and a system buildout, with a maximum loan amount of 159,496 million yen (about US$1.049 billion at the Federal Reserve’s February 6, 2025 USD/JPY rate) and an implementation schedule targeting commercial operations by December 2028 (JICA, February 21, 2025). Consequently, Japan has both a financing track record and a technology narrative in Panama’s transport sector.
Notably, Japan’s role is visible in both financing and messaging. JICA set the maximum Panama Metro Line 3 loan at ¥159,496 million. That equals roughly US$1.05 billion at mid-February 2025 exchange rates (JICA, February 21, 2025; Federal Reserve H.10). Moreover, JICA described procurement as “General Untied” and highlighted “high-quality monorail vehicles” (JICA, February 21, 2025). Separately, executives from Japan Mizuho Bank expressed interest in financing the Panamá–David rail project. Consequently, Panama can pair US-led planning with Japanese long-term capital, without leaning on Chinese state finance.
Put those pieces together and Panama starts looking like a template:
- China helped shape feasibility work.
- The US, through an American engineering firm, now shapes the master plan and standards pathway.
- Japan signals long-horizon financing interest and already finances a flagship metro line.
That is not just “more investment.” It is a coordinated attempt to win the project pipeline.
US foreign investments: Latin America’s pressure campaign
Hemisphere investment strategy, with a side of political theatre
Latin America tends to hate being told it has a “backyard.” Nevertheless, the US clearly wants the region to behave like a strategic depth zone again.
In November 2025, Reuters reported that Washington announced a visa policy targeting Central American nationals “acting on behalf of” Beijing, and China condemned the move as turning visas into political leverage (Reuters, November 26, 2025). That is not investment. However, it functions as a cost signal: work too closely with Beijing, and the US can impose personal and reputational penalties.
Meanwhile, the political messaging in Panama itself has grown sharper. In late December 2025, the demolition of a monument honouring Panama’s Chinese community triggered condemnation from Beijing and a domestic backlash in Panama, amid broader pressure from the US to reduce ties with China (AP News, December 30, 2025). Even if the demolition had local causes, the timing made it feel like a proxy argument played in public space.
Here is the light humour for this section: diplomacy is the only sport where a statue can become a scorecard overnight.
US foreign investments and Venezuela’s “risk repricing” shockwave
The biggest “China uncertainty” headline in the region, in early January 2026, came from Venezuela.
On January 5, 2026, Reuters reported that the US government wanted oil majors to finance investment to revive Venezuela’s oil sector, framing the logic as a path to recover debts, while noting security, legal, and political risks (Reuters, January 5, 2026). Notably, this is not classic development aid. Instead, it is state-shaped capital allocation to secure strategic energy outcomes.
Meanwhile, the same week’s geopolitical turbulence spooked Beijing. Reuters reported on January 5, 2026 that China’s top financial regulator asked policy banks and major lenders to report their lending exposure to Venezuela after the US capture of President Nicolás Maduro, as Bloomberg reported (Reuters, January 5, 2026). Additionally, Reuters reported that China’s top diplomat accused the US of acting like a “world judge” and that Beijing planned to confront Washington at the United Nations over legality questions (Reuters, January 5, 2026).
For investment analysis, the key point is not rhetoric. Instead, it is balance-sheet exposure. Moreover, Venezuela sits in the overlap between Chinese “loans-for-oil” style financing and US strategic energy priorities. When the political ground shifts abruptly, Chinese lenders and state-owned enterprises often face a painful choice: absorb losses, renegotiate, or accept new Western influence over project governance.
In other words, US foreign investments here do not only “replace” China. Instead, they also change the risk environment in which Chinese capital operates.
Belt and Road is not dead—so what exactly is changing?
It would be a mistake to declare victory.
In May 2025, Reuters reported that China and Colombia signed a Belt and Road cooperation plan, with Colombia’s foreign minister calling it a bold step and noting China’s growing role as a trading partner (Reuters, May 14, 2025). So, the region remains contested.
However, the broader China-finance story has constraints. AidData has estimated that total outstanding debt in the developing world to China is at least US$1.1 trillion and potentially as high as US$1.5 trillion, and that a large share of China’s overseas lending portfolio supports countries in financial distress (AidData, “Belt and Road Reboot”). Similarly, Reuters has reported on AidData findings that Chinese financial institutions lent US$1.34 trillion to developing countries from 2000 to 2021, and that China shifted toward “rescue lending” as risks rose (Reuters, November 6, 2023).
So, Beijing still plays. Yet, it plays with a heavier debt overhang and a more cautious lending posture than the early BRI years.
That creates an opening for US foreign investments if Washington can move fast enough and accept that “good governance” sometimes means “boring but bankable.”
US foreign investments: Africa’s “trade, not aid” reboot
US foreign investments shift from grants to term sheets
Africa is where the Trump administration’s approach looks most explicit: swap open-ended aid narratives for commercial diplomacy and targeted financing.
In January 2025, Reuters reported on a memo urging US Agency for International Development (USAID) staff to align with an “America First” review, alongside a sweeping stop-work order and a 90-day pause in foreign aid (Reuters, January 26, 2025). That created real disruption. However, it also signalled that Washington wanted different tools.
The administration is trying to rebrand and restructure parts of US engagement away from grant-style assistance and toward commercial deals and development finance, and it’s using “trade, not aid” as the headline.
In May 2025, Reuters reported that senior US Africa official Troy Fitrell framed the new doctrine bluntly: “Assistance involves a donor and a recipient, but commerce is an exchange between equals.” — Troy Fitrell, Reuters
In the same report, Fitrell said US ambassadors had shepherded 33 agreements worth US$6 billion in Trump’s first 100 days (Reuters, May 15, 2025). Notably, that is the kind of number policymakers cite when they want to show action without promising endless spending.
A brief aside fits here: in Washington, the slogan is simple, but the paperwork is not.
Lobito Corridor: strategic infrastructure financing, mineral logistics, and aerospace metals
Notably, Panama is a supply-chain chokepoint, while Angola’s Lobito Corridor is an upstream supply-chain corridor for critical minerals—and both matter to aerospace.
In December 2025, Reuters reported that the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) signed a US$553 million loan with a consortium to refurbish an Angolan railway line, part of the Lobito critical minerals transport corridor linking copper and cobalt mines to the Atlantic coast. Additionally, Reuters reported that the project aimed to counter China’s revival of the Tanzania-Zambia rail corridor, and that it involved building new rail lines in Zambia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to connect with Angola’s existing Benguela line (Reuters, December 17, 2025).
Critical minerals that matter to aerospace
That corridor matters because cobalt and copper sit inside multiple aerospace-relevant systems:
- Cobalt appears in high-temperature superalloys used in turbine engines and hot-section components.
- Copper sits inside electrical architectures, including aircraft wiring, ground power systems, and expanding hybridisation efforts.
- Critical-minerals transport reliability shapes the cost curve for everything from jet engines to next-generation electrified ground support equipment.
In DFC’s own press release on the Lobito deal, the agency said its investment, alongside the Development Bank of Southern Africa, aimed to increase transportation capacity tenfold to 4.6 million metric tons and reduce transport costs by up to 30 percent (DFC, December 17, 2025). That is the kind of logistics delta that changes procurement math.
DFC CEO Ben Black also made the Trump-era framing explicit: “This investment builds on the impactful work DFC is already leading along the corridor….” — Ben Black, CEO, DFC
Importantly, this is also where the “new administration” story intersects the “previous administration” story. The same DFC loan had roots in earlier commitments, including Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) signalling, before the Trump-era finalisation (DFC, December 4, 2024). Consequently, the shift is a change in emphasis: more national-security logic, less climate-first branding.
Health systems as strategic infrastructure: Kenya and Côte d’Ivoire
Aviation depends on resilient public health more than most people admit. After all, pandemics do not respect hub-and-spoke networks.
In December 2025, Reuters reported that the US would provide more than US$1.6 billion to Kenya’s health system under a five-year “America First” global health agreement (Reuters, December 4, 2025). Similarly, AP News reported that the US committed US$480 million to Côte d’Ivoire’s health sector under a new bilateral deal, with Côte d’Ivoire committing substantial co-financing through 2030 (AP News, December 30, 2025).
From a policy lens, these agreements do two things at once:
- They keep US influence present in essential services, even as classic aid structures change.
- They embed a shared-responsibility model that looks more like co-investment than charity.
For countries deciding between Chinese project finance and Western blended finance, that distinction matters. Moreover, it changes domestic politics: governments can describe US deals as “partnership” rather than dependence.
US foreign investments: the Indo-Pacific supply-chain logic
US foreign investments and semiconductors: why avionics cares
If you want to understand why US foreign investments increasingly focus on technology ecosystems, start with a simple truth: modern aerospace is software wrapped around hardware, and hardware now means chips.
In January 2024, Reuters reported that fifteen US firms expressed interest in investing about US$8 billion in Vietnam in clean energy and infrastructure, contingent on regulatory progress (Reuters, January 26, 2024). Then, in March 2025, Reuters reported that Vietnam expected to sign pacts with the US as trade and energy officials met, as part of Hanoi’s broader effort to manage tariff risks and economic ties (Reuters, March 10, 2025).
From an aviation standpoint, Vietnam matters because:
- It sits in the electronics supply chain that supports cockpit systems, communications, and sensor packages.
- It offers an alternative manufacturing and packaging base as firms reduce China concentration.
- It shapes future maintenance and component repair ecosystems in the region.
However, the Trump-era challenge is not “does this matter?” It is “can Washington keep the economic-security logic aligned with private-sector incentives?”
In December 2025, a Congressional Research Service brief noted that the second Trump administration continued many increases in US-Vietnam security cooperation undertaken previously (Congressional Research Service, November 21, 2025). That continuity gives investors a baseline. Yet, it also suggests that competition with China now drives policy.
Comparing the Trump approach to the prior administration’s PGII frame
However, the real “before vs after” story is less about slogans and more about timelines. In infrastructure diplomacy, execution speed is a policy choice.
Under the previous US administration, the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII) was billed as the West’s answer. Yet Reuters Breakingviews argued the money was slow to flow, in part because the model leaned on high standards and private capital mobilisation. It also noted that governments had put up relatively little hard cash and private capital was still lagging (Reuters Breakingviews, September 25, 2023).
Meanwhile, China launched the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013 and moved quickly from vision to financing. In November 2014, President Xi Jinping announced an initial US$40 billion Silk Road infrastructure fund (Reuters, November 8, 2014). Reuters Breakingviews also noted that BRI has sourced most of its funding from Chinese state‑controlled banks (Reuters Breakingviews, September 25, 2023). That structure tends to shorten the distance between pledge, contract, and ground‑breaking, i.e. faster.
China has never published a single “BRI budget.” However, research that tracks signed contracts and investments shows how dramatically the scale expanded. The Green Finance & Development Center estimates cumulative BRI engagement reached about US$1.175 trillion by 2024 (Green Finance & Development Center, February 27, 2025). Moreover, its 2025 mid‑year update reports US$66.2 billion in construction contracts and US$57.1 billion in investments in the first half of 2025 alone (Green Finance & Development Center, July 17, 2025).
US foreign investments and the compete-on-execution pivot
Consequently, the Trump administration’s intent reads as a compete‑on‑execution pivot: scale up the US government’s deal tools and move faster on bankable infrastructure. In July 2025, Reuters reported a White House proposal to expand the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) financing capacity from US$60 billion to US$250 billion, alongside a push for larger investments with less congressional oversight (Reuters, July 25, 2025). Notably, DFC says the FY26 National Defense Authorization Act signed on December 18, 2025 lifted its investment cap to US$205 billion and created a US$5 billion equity revolving fund (DFC, December 18, 2025). Meanwhile, Panama’s decision to exit China launched the Belt and Road Initiative—praised by Secretary of State Marco Rubio—shows the “replacement” intent being applied at a strategic chokepoint (Reuters, February 3, 2025).
Under Trump, the story shifts toward:
- Bigger authority for the US International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) and more explicit national-security alignment.
- More willingness to frame projects as strategic competition, not climate leadership.
- More direct pressure tools (visa restrictions, port strategies) that increase China-facing costs.
The Trump administration proposal for a much bigger role for DFC—raising its spending power to US$250 billion from US$60 billion, expanding leeway to finance projects in high-income countries, and enhancing its national-security focus.
With the US foreign investments that is a material change. Moreover, it suggests Washington wants to compete with Beijing not only in poorer countries, but also in strategic “middle” jurisdictions where infrastructure decisions shape maritime access, technology standards, and military logistics.
What it means for Canada’s global economy—and for aerospace
The Canadian export reality behind the optimism
Canada’s interest in US foreign investments is not ideological. It is structural.
In 2024, about 76% of Canada’s merchandise exports went to the United States, according to Statistics Canada (Statistics Canada, October 27, 2025). Consequently, a stronger, more influential US economy generally means stronger Canadian demand, especially in integrated sectors.
From a North American perspective, Washington’s renewed investment push supports Canadian stability, market access, and supply-chain predictability.
Additionally, aerospace is a multiplier sector. When trade routes stabilise, airlines plan fleets with more confidence. When minerals and semiconductors flow reliably, manufacturers hit delivery targets with fewer costly disruptions.
If you want a related Fliegerfaust read on how policy shocks spill into aviation, start here: Tariffs Rock Aerospace: Is Total Free Trade North America’s Fix?.
Why Panama’s infrastructure matters to aviation, not just shipping
It is tempting to treat Panama as a maritime-only story. However, aviation sits on the same supply-chain ladder.
First, the canal’s port ecosystem influences air cargo flows. Moreover, when shipping delays rise, air freight demand often spikes—especially for aerospace spares and high-value electronics.
Second, Reuters reporting on canal-zone expansion even referenced sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) expectations in Panama, noting delays in a previously anticipated facility (Reuters, November 3, 2025). That matters because SAF supply chains will shape airline decarbonisation strategies for decades.
Third, rail links like Panama–David aim to move freight faster across the country and potentially into Costa Rica. Even if rail does not replace air, it changes the logistics mix around airports, industrial zones, and export processing.
For broader strategy context, this Fliegerfaust piece maps the worldview behind the shift: U.S. Foreign Policy Reset: Multipolar Strategy.
Canada, China, and the minerals that keep aircraft flying
Competition with China is not only about ports and politics. It is also about materials.
In aerospace, titanium, nickel, cobalt, and rare earth elements show up in engines, structures, and electronics. Consequently, corridors like Lobito, which aim to move copper and cobalt more efficiently, affect cost and availability for Western manufacturers.
Canada also sits inside this minerals conversation, both as a supplier and as an advanced manufacturing hub. Additionally, policy choices about sanction waivers and supply security can hit aviation directly—something you have already covered on Fliegerfaust: Canada Suspends Sanctions on Russia: The Airbus Waiver.
Finally, new investment competition will shape where MRO, parts warehousing, and component repair ecosystems cluster. For a Canadian example of how infrastructure and industrial policy create aviation-adjacent capability, see: Volatus Mirabel innovation centre: Canada’s new drone hub.
Conclusion: a positive return, with hard questions attached
US foreign investments now look more deliberate than they did a few years ago. Moreover, the pattern emerging since January 2025 suggests a competitive doctrine: use development finance, allied capital, and regulatory pressure to reclaim strategic space that China filled through the Belt and Road Initiative.
Panama illustrates the shift in the clearest terms. Additionally, when an American firm updates a national rail master plan, when Japanese lenders circle the financing, and when port concessions enter a new tender cycle under heavy US attention, the message is simple: Washington wants back into the infrastructure game (Presidencia de Panamá, December 26, 2024; Reuters, February 3, 2025).
Africa
Africa shows a parallel logic. Furthermore, the Lobito Corridor financing mixes mineral security, infrastructure upgrades, and explicit competition with Beijing (Reuters, December 17, 2025).
Still, the comeback carries risks. Notably, the more Washington ties investment to coercive tools and geopolitical pressure, the easier it becomes for partners to view “choice” as “compliance.” Moreover, if the US wants to outcompete China sustainably, it must deliver projects that finish on time, price risk honestly, and avoid turning every rail line into a referendum on sovereignty.
US foreign investments: the question
So, here is the critical question Canada should ask while cheering the renewed momentum: if US foreign investments are truly returning, will Washington keep winning by building better deals—or will it try to win by forcing faster ones?
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Sources
- Reuters — Rubio hails Panama’s move to exit Chinese infrastructure plan (February 3, 2025).
- Reuters — CK Hutchison-operated Panama ports could be taken over by state partnerships, president says (July 31, 2025).
- Reuters — CK Hutchison invested $1.7 bln in Panama, surpassing obligations, it says (April 9, 2025).
- Reuters — Panama Canal to launch tender for construction, operation of two ports, source says (August 14, 2025).
- Reuters — Panama Canal to complete prequalification for port concessions in early 2026 (November 3, 2025).
- Reuters — U.S. targets China’s grip on global ports in sweeping maritime mission (September 16, 2025).
- Presidencia de la República de Panamá — Contratan empresa para actualizar el Plan Maestro del Tren Panamá-David-Frontera (December 26, 2024).
- International Railway Journal — Aecom to update Panama railway masterplan (January 2, 2025).
- Swissinfo (EFE) — Panamá contrata firma de EE.UU. para actualizar gran proyecto de tren pretendido por China (December 27, 2024).
- La Estrella de Panamá (EFE) — Tren Panamá – David: banco japonés muestra interés en financiar la obra (August 11, 2025).
- JICA — Signing of Japanese ODA Loan Agreement with Panama (Panama Metro Line 3) (February 21, 2025).
- AP News — Beijing condemns the demolition of a monument honoring the Chinese community in Panama (December 30, 2025).
- Reuters — China protests US move to restrict visas for Central Americans with Beijing ties (November 26, 2025).
- Reuters — US pushes oil majors to invest big in Venezuela if they want to recover debts (January 5, 2026).
- Reuters — China nudges banks to disclose lending ties with Venezuela, Bloomberg News reports (January 5, 2026).
- Reuters — US capture of Maduro tests limits of China’s diplomatic push (January 5, 2026).
- Reuters — China, Colombia sign Belt and Road cooperation pact (May 14, 2025).
- Reuters — Trump administration memo tells USAID to put “America First” in reviewing foreign aid (January 26, 2025).
- Reuters — US shifting Africa strategy to ‘trade, not aid’, envoy says (May 15, 2025).
- Reuters — US agency, consortium sign $553 million loan for Angola railway revamp (December 17, 2025).
- DFC — DFC CEO Ben Black Signs Loan Agreement for Lobito Atlantic Railway (December 17, 2025).
- Reuters — Trump administration proposes bigger role for Development Finance Corporation (July 25, 2025).
- AP News — US commits $480m in health funding to Ivory Coast, the latest to sign ‘America First’ health deals (December 30, 2025).
- Reuters (Video) — US signs pact with Kenya under ‘America First’ global health plan (December 4, 2025).
- Reuters — Fifteen US semiconductors firms eye $8 bln investment in Vietnam, senior US official (January 26, 2024).
- Reuters — Vietnam to sign U.S. deals as trade, energy officials meet, document shows (March 10, 2025).
- Congressional Research Service — U.S.-Vietnam Relations (November 21, 2025).
- White House Archives — Remarks by President Biden at Launch of the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (June 26, 2022).
- Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs — Factsheet on the G7 Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (May 20, 2023).
- GAO — China’s Investments Significantly Outpace the U.S. (September 12, 2024).
- AidData — Belt and Road Reboot (Executive Summary) (accessed January 2026).
- Statistics Canada — Canada’s Economy During Recent … (export dependence on the US) (October 27, 2025).
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