How can the same jet sit at the centre of airBaltic’s retreat and BermudAir’s expansion?
A220 fleet strategy: On August 11, 2026, Latvia’s airBaltic disclosed plans to cut its A220-300 fleet from 54 aircraft to 36 by year-end. One day later, Leeham News and Analysis reported Bermuda-based BermudAir’s ambition to operate more than 20 A220s by decade-end.
However, BermudAir’s timetable carries an immediate caveat. Leeham reports seven A220s by December 31, 2026, while Runway Girl Network places firm-order deliveries in late 2027. No public disclosure identifies the source of those first aircraft.
The contrast is not an aircraft referendum. airBaltic faces a liquidity and debt crisis after an aggressive growth phase. BermudAir sees the A220 as a route-opening step above its Embraer E-Jets. Therefore, the airframe is the common denominator, while airline economics produce opposite decisions.
A220 fleet strategy: airBaltic retreats
A220 restructuring centres the fleet on Riga
airBaltic’s investor-relations page currently lists 54 Airbus A220-300s. The airline’s official August 11 business plan shows 36 aircraft in 2026. Its planning table then rises gradually to 41 aircraft in 2031.
That represents an 18-aircraft reduction within less than five months. Crucially, airBaltic has not disclosed the complete disposal mechanism. Lease returns, sales and delivery changes remain possible, yet each option carries different financial consequences.
The A220 fleet strategy is clear on fleet size but incomplete on execution. Riga will remain the core hub, while the airline favours frequency in stronger markets. Scheduled available seat-kilometres (ASKs) should fall from 9.6 billion in 2026 to 8.7 billion in 2027.
“Thus, this business plan is about making disciplined choices that strengthen airBaltic’s long-term competitiveness…” — Erno Hildén, President and Chief Executive Officer, airBaltic, via AirlineGeeks.
Meanwhile, aircraft, crew, maintenance and insurance (ACMI) leasing becomes more important. The Lufthansa Group wet-lease agreement allows up to 21 A220-300s in summer and five in winter.
Notably, airBaltic’s first-quarter accounts show ACMI lease revenue increased 28.7% to €21.35 million. ACMI-out ASKs rose 34.4%, while ACMI-out flights increased 33.5%. The plan also targets about €45 million in recurring annual operating-cost reductions.
Even so, a 36-aircraft fleet creates an allocation problem. Every aircraft assigned to a partner is unavailable for airBaltic’s own network. Management has not published the eventual split between Riga flying and external customers.
The bridge, recapitalisation and August 14 deadline
airBaltic first seeks €225 million of interim financing for near-term liquidity. The bridge would rank first against collateral already securing the airline’s 2029 notes. Management values that package at €506 million.
Second, permanent exit financing would comprise €225 million of new debt and €100 million of new equity. The €325 million package would repay the interim bridge. It also assumes partial conversion of the 2029 notes into equity and up to €125 million of take-back debt.
Consequently, the €225 million bridge should not be added casually to the €325 million exit package. Calling the result a €550 million permanent rescue would misstate the structure. This A220 fleet strategy requires a balance-sheet reset, not another routine credit line.
airBaltic has €380 million of senior secured notes due in August 2029. The base coupon is 14.5%. Fitch Ratings reported that the annual rate applied to the August 14, 2026 payment increased to 16.5% after a reserve shortfall.
The airline’s supplemental bondholder notice seeks approval to capitalise interest due on August 14 and November 14. It also requests waivers covering the bond-service reserve and minimum-liquidity requirements.
An August 3 meeting failed to reach the required 75% quorum. The official adjournment notice schedules a reconvened meeting for August 17, 2026 at 13:00 British Summer Time. The revised voting deadline was 16:00 British Summer Time on August 14.
As of the publication cutoff, shortly after the August 14 voting deadline, airBaltic’s official bondholder page carried no notice confirming a cash coupon payment or changing the August 17 timetable. Therefore, this article does not characterise the payment as completed or missed.
The company says its flight programme will continue and expects no passenger disruption during the process. Still, aircraft do not read balance sheets, although airline boards eventually must.
First-quarter accounts explain the urgency
The airBaltic first-quarter 2026 financial statements show improving revenue but severe financial strain. Operating revenue rose 12.3% to €149.1 million. Adjusted earnings before interest, tax, depreciation, amortisation and aircraft rental costs (EBITDAR) improved to €7 million.
However, the net loss widened to €70.1 million. At March 31, negative equity reached €249.3 million. Current liabilities exceeded current assets by €415.1 million.
Unrestricted cash stood at only €15.6 million. Another €17.2 million remained inside the restricted bond-service reserve. Latvia also approved a €30 million short-term loan facility, with final repayment due by August 31.
Moreover, the accounts identify material uncertainties that may cast significant doubt on airBaltic’s ability to continue as a going concern. Management still considered the going-concern accounting basis appropriate. The company also suspended work on its initial public offering.
Latvia owns 88.37% of airBaltic, while Lufthansa owns 10%. Creditors, the Latvian state and prospective investors are now being asked to absorb the cost of the correction. The A220 fleet strategy cannot succeed unless the capital structure changes with the fleet.
Engine damage is now a legacy issue?
Pratt & Whitney PW1500G geared turbofan (GTF) constraints inflicted substantial operational damage. Reuters reported in January 2025 that airBaltic would cancel 4,670 summer flights. It removed 19 routes and reduced frequencies on another 21.
By the first quarter of 2026, however, the immediate picture had changed. airBaltic recorded no aircraft unavailable for engine-related reasons throughout the quarter. The comparable 2025 average was 13 aircraft.
Separately, Reuters reported on July 21 that A220 and Embraer E2 groundings had virtually disappeared. Pratt & Whitney expected the remaining cases to reach zero within months.
Our Fliegerfaust analysis of the A220 ramp and engine outlook examined that industrial problem. The engine crisis damaged schedules, revenue and expansion assumptions. Yet current liquidity and leverage now drive the emergency.
Therefore, describing the restructuring simply as an A220 engine problem would be outdated. Technical availability improved as the financial consequences of earlier disruption and expansion crystallised.
A220 fleet strategy: BermudAir expands
A220 growth plan starts with ten firm aircraft
Airbus announced on July 22, 2026 that BermudAir had ordered 10 A220-300s. The manufacturer booked the transaction in March under an undisclosed customer. It is BermudAir’s first Airbus order.
“The A220 is the ideal aircraft to support the next phase of BermudAir’s growth.” — Adam Scott, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, BermudAir, via Airbus.
Leeham News and Analysis reported seven A220s by the end of 2026. It places the fleet at least 10 by the end of 2027 and above 20 by decade-end.
Yet Runway Girl Network reported that deliveries from the firm order begin in the fourth quarter of 2027. It identifies Odyssey as the contract holder and BermudAir as the operator.
Both accounts can be correct if BermudAir sources the first aircraft through separate leases or another arrangement. No authoritative public source identifies that bridge fleet. Accordingly, the A220 fleet strategy has a clear destination but an unresolved first step.
A 135-seat cabin supports thin Atlantic routes
Airbus says BermudAir’s A220-300s will carry 135 passengers in three classes. Leeham reports a likely layout with 12 business-class and 40 premium-economy seats. That would leave about 83 economy seats, although BermudAir has not confirmed the final breakdown.
Additionally, Runway Girl Network says the airline has studied Safran recliners used aboard Breeze Airways A220s. BermudAir also expects Airbus’s larger overhead bins, which add about 20% more carry-on volume.
Meanwhile, the aircraft will eventually replace four Embraer E-Jets as their leases expire. BermudAir is not rushing that transition. Instead, it intends to build toward a single-type Airbus operation while preserving current capacity.
Reuters reported from Farnborough that the airline planned to more than double its 11 routes by year-end. New flying includes markets involving Turks and Caicos, Belize and Anguilla.
Moreover, BermudAir plans to add Wi-Fi, which its existing aircraft lack. Airbus publishes A220 family range at up to 3,600 nautical miles, or 6,700 kilometres. Airbus claims 25% lower fuel burn and carbon-dioxide emissions per seat than previous-generation aircraft.
Scott also cites performance at constrained airports. However, the Bermuda Airport Authority’s aeronautical information publication lists a 2,958-metre runway at L.F. Wade International Airport.
Therefore, the case is not merely a short-runway claim at BermudAir’s home airport. It combines right-sized capacity, overwater range, premium revenue and flexibility at smaller destinations.
“In layman’s terms, the A220 is to my mind the narrowbody equivalent of what the [787] Dreamliner represents.” — Adam Scott, Founder and Chief Executive Officer, BermudAir, via Leeham News and Analysis.
The A220 may be quiet in the cabin, but it is loud in a route-planning meeting.
The A220-100 remains strategically relevant
BermudAir is also studying the smaller A220-100 for targeted thin routes in the Americas. That interest runs against the industry’s louder calls for a stretched A220-500.
Moreover, two A220 variants could preserve training and systems commonality while offering different capacity points. The smaller model may carry higher unit costs, but it could reduce total trip risk where demand remains limited.
This angle complements our Fliegerfaust analysis of the Airbus A220-500 launch case. Larger airlines and lessors often emphasise more seats and lower unit cost. BermudAir instead emphasises market creation and right-sized capacity.
The A220 fleet strategy therefore challenges a familiar assumption. Upgauging improves economics only when demand grows with the gauge.
A220 fleet strategy: what the divergence proves
The wider A220 programme retains momentum
Airbus reported 526 A220 deliveries to more than 25 operators by June 30, 2026. Historical orders exceeded 1,100 aircraft. Those figures do not describe a programme in commercial retreat.
Furthermore, engine availability has improved, while Airbus continues increasing production and developing higher-density configurations. Our Fliegerfaust report on the A220 ramp-up, 160-seat cabin and supply chain examines that industrial momentum.
Consequently, airBaltic’s contraction should not define the wider programme. Equally, BermudAir’s order does not prove that every operator should add A220s. Each airline must match capacity, range, utilisation and financing to its own network.
The A220 fleet strategy at both carriers illustrates the same principle from opposite directions. A capable aircraft can support growth or retrenchment because the airframe does not determine the operator’s capital costs.
A220 fleet plans depend on trip economics
BermudAir’s decision rests on total trip economics across thin markets. It can accept a higher seat cost than a larger narrowbody if the smaller aircraft protects fares and load factors. An empty seat has an exceptionally poor yield.
airBaltic faces the reverse problem. Its fleet offers commonality and improving availability, but 54 aircraft create obligations across leases, crews and financing. The airline now wants fewer assets and more partner-backed ACMI flying.
Therefore, the comparison should not become a contest between technical believers and sceptics. BermudAir is buying a mission fit. airBaltic is reducing financial exposure after a severe operating and capital shock.
In both cases, the A220 fleet strategy will succeed only when each flight generates enough contribution to cover network and capital costs. Manufacturer efficiency claims remain relevant, but cash conversion decides the outcome.
Execution risk now moves to different places
airBaltic must secure interim financing, obtain creditor consent and remove 18 aircraft without destabilising its core network. It must also protect Riga connectivity while meeting ACMI commitments to stronger partners.
BermudAir must bring its first seven A220s into service, recruit crews and develop maintenance depth. It must also prove that new Atlantic and Caribbean routes can mature at the planned pace.
Meanwhile, both airlines face fuel volatility, supply-chain exposure and seasonal demand. Their risks differ in scale, but neither plan becomes safe because the aircraft performs well.
Overall, this A220 fleet strategy comparison rewards disciplined execution rather than fleet-count headlines. The next meaningful evidence will come from financing closes, aircraft deliveries, route performance and sustained cash generation.
Conclusion: A220 fleet strategy needs capital discipline
airBaltic and BermudAir are moving in opposite directions without delivering opposite verdicts on the aircraft. BermudAir sees a route-opening platform between regional jets and larger narrowbodies. airBaltic sees a capable fleet that its present balance sheet cannot support at the former scale.
Therefore, airBaltic’s crisis is increasingly difficult to call an A220 problem. It is an airline-finance problem amplified by genuine engine disruption. Availability has improved, but negative equity, restricted liquidity and expensive debt remain.
BermudAir’s logic appears stronger at the aircraft-selection level. However, the unexplained bridge fleet and rapid route expansion deserve continued scrutiny. A suitable aircraft cannot substitute for financing, operational depth or proven demand.
My critical view is that airBaltic expanded before its capital base could absorb a prolonged operational shock. BermudAir has chosen an appropriate aircraft category, but it has not yet proved the accelerated fleet timetable.
Ultimately, A220 fleet strategy must be judged by financing discipline and cash generation.
Will investors and airline boards judge these plans by order headlines, or by the cash each aircraft produces?
What do you think?
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Sources
Company and primary sources
- airBaltic — Investor Relations (accessed August 14, 2026).
- airBaltic — Air Baltic Corporation AS Outlines Business Plan to Strengthen Long-Term Sustainability (August 11, 2026).
- airBaltic — Bonds – Investor relations (accessed August 14, 2026).
- airBaltic — Supplemental Notice Relating to the General Meeting of Bondholders (July 28, 2026).
- airBaltic — Notice of Adjournment Relating to the General Meeting of Bondholders (August 3, 2026).
- airBaltic — airBaltic Group 2026 Q1 Interim Unaudited Financial Statements (May 13, 2026).
- Lufthansa Group — Lufthansa Group Extends Wet Lease Partnership with airBaltic (September 13, 2024).
- Airbus — BermudAir Becomes the Newest A220 Customer (July 22, 2026).
- Bermuda Airport Authority — AIP for BERMUDA (section AD-2.TXKF) valid from 27 NOV 2025 (accessed August 14, 2026).
Independent reporting and analysis
- AirlineGeeks — AirBaltic to Shrink A220 Fleet (August 11, 2026).
- Fitch Ratings — Fitch Places airBaltic on Rating Watch Negative (July 7, 2026).
- Reuters — AirBaltic Cancels Summer Flights, Hit by Pratt and Whitney Maintenance Delays (January 2, 2025).
- Reuters — Pratt & Whitney Says Engine Maintenance Disruption Easing (July 21, 2026).
- Leeham News and Analysis — Airbus A220’s Performance Drives BermudAir’s Fleet Growth Plan (August 12, 2026).
- Runway Girl Network — BermudAir to Become A220-300 Operator, Eyes Breeze Style Recliners (July 22, 2026).
- Reuters — BermudAir Orders 10 Airbus A220 Planes as Part of Expansion Plan (July 22, 2026).
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